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Brexit, prerogative and the courts: why did political constitutionalists support 
the Government side in Miller? 
Gavin Phillipson*   
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
What makes the case of Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union1 of 
interest in a volume dedicated to the rise of judicial power in the constitution? What makes 
it noteworthy as a point of contestation between legal and political constitutionalists? One 
might observe first that Miller was probably unique in British constitutional history in terms 
of the sheer scale of both academic and general public interest that it generated. Dubbed 
the ‘constitutional case of the century’, it received saturation, if sometimes sensationalist, 
coverage across the UK print and broadcast media and was widely reported around the 
world. Given that it concerned the issue of Brexit – the most explosively contentious as well 
as the most important issue in British politics - this was perhaps not surprising. More 
importantly for our purposes, it produced a volume and intensity of engagement by the 
academic community that was unprecedented. Several hundred thousand words of 
commentary about it were published in a few short months, on the UKCLA blog and 
elsewhere,2 including notable contributions by scholars from Australia3 and New Zealand.4 It 
also provoked passionate disagreement. The public law community was split down the 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Durham University, UK. An earlier version of this paper was given at a seminar at 
City University on 1 November 2017. The author is grateful to John Stanton for arranging and 
chairing it and all the participants. Many thanks also to Robert Craig and Alison Young for very 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article and particularly to Graham Gee for his invaluable 
editorial input. The usual disclaimer applies. All posts cited on the UK Const L. Blog are available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/. All websites were last visited on 15 December 2017. 
1 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5; 
[2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 (hereafter ‘Miller’). 
2 See e.g. the list of contributions compiled by R. Craig, ‘Miller: An Index of Reports and 
Commentary’ available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/01/25/robert-craig-miller-an-index-
of-reports-and-commentary/ 
3 N. Aroney, ‘R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing 
Syllogisms’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 685. 
4 C. McLachlan, ‘The Foreign Affairs Treaty Prerogative and the Law of the Land’, U.K. Const. L. Blog 
(14th Nov 2016).  
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middle. Moreover, academic commentary, unusually, played a prominent part in providing 
legal arguments used in the case. In particular, when the Government’s lawyers, following 
their comprehensive defeat in the Divisional Court, were forced to ‘retool’, they did so very 
largely by drawing on academic criticism of the Divisional Court decision.   
Another notable feature of the case for our purposes is that Policy Exchange’s 
Judicial Power Project5, which takes a highly sceptical stance on judicial power in the 
constitution, took a strongly pro-Government line throughout. This echoed the way that the 
public law community split on Miller. Broadly speaking, those seen as having a political 
constitutionalist bent – favouring political determinations of constitutional questions, and 
democratic power over judicial determination and judicial power – supported the 
Government side;6 legal constitutionalists the claimant side. There were of course 
exceptions: Mark Elliott, whom I would regard as a moderate legal constitutionalist, argued 
strongly for the Government side throughout.7 Conversely Keith Ewing, one of the most 
long-standing and doughty advocates of the political constitution, argued against use of the 
prerogative.8  But the general tendency was clear. 
Why then the intense controversy? At a general level, the stakes were 
extraordinarily high, given that the case related to the intensely divisive issue of Brexit, and 
followed the shock result of a nationwide referendum, in which a slim but clear majority 
voted to leave the EU.9 More specifically, the case concerned a challenge to the 
Government’s assertion that it intended to use the ‘foreign affairs’ prerogative to 
commence the formal process of withdrawal by triggering Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
And it is here that we start to uncover the deeper sources of the legal controversy. Since the 
                                                          
5 See generally https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/  
6 I would include within this list Richard Ekins, John Finnis, Adam Tomkins, Sir Stephen Laws, Mikolaj 
Barczentewicz, Timothy Endicott, Christopher Forsyth and Mike Gordon, all of whose work is 
discussed and cited in this paper.   
7 Though see e.g. his critical analysis of some of the initial Government arguments: 
https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/mark-elliott-the-governments-case-in-the-article-50-litigation-a-
critique/ 
8 See K. Ewing, ‘Brexit and Parliamentary sovereignty’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 711, 716. He was joined in 
this by Robert Craig: ‘Casting Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative, Statute and Article 50 
after the EU Referendum’ (2016) 79(6) MLR 1041; both considered that there was already a 
statutory power available to the Government via the reception into UK law of Article 50. This 
argument was not generally accepted; for a rebuttal, see below, note 19.  
9 On 23 June 2016 the people of the UK and Gibraltar voted to leave the European Union by 51.89% 
cent to 48.11%.  
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early 17th century Case of Proclamations10 courts have asserted that they have the power to 
adjudicate upon whether a claimed prerogative power exists and to delineate its scope. This 
was followed by a line of cases governing clashes between prerogative and statute. One well 
known decision, De Keyser’s,11 determined that where Parliament legislates in an area 
previously occupied by the prerogative or abrogates it by specific statutory provision, the 
prerogative must give way and go into ‘abeyance’. Another key principle, enunciated by the 
House of Lords in the Rayner case, is that: 
the Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend to 
altering the law or conferring rights upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights 
which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament.12 
This principle was said to be rooted in the declaration in Article 1 of the Bill of Rights 1689 
that ‘the pretended power of suspending of laws or the execution of laws by regal authority 
without consent of Parlyament is illegall’. On this basis it has been said judicially that ‘since 
the 17th century the prerogative has not empowered the Crown to change English common 
law or statute law’.13 Finally, the decisions in Fire Brigades Union14 and Laker Airways15 were 
said to give rise to a more specific, albeit related, principle: that the prerogative may not be 
used to ‘frustrate’ the intention of Parliament as expressed in any statute (hereafter, ‘the 
frustration principle’).16  
At first sight, it might not be immediately apparent why a case concerned with the 
above principles should divide opinion as between legal and political constitutionalists. For 
arguably these principles flow logically from one of the simplest aspects of the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty: that Acts of Parliament, as the highest form of law, rank above 
inferior sources, including both prerogative and common law.  Thus courts, in affirming 
them, may be seen not as advancing their own powers, but simply defending Parliament’s. 
                                                          
10  (1610) 12 Co. Rep. 74; 77 E.R. 1352 
11 Attorney General v De Keyser’s Hotel [1920] AC 508, 540 (HL). 
12 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane Ltd) v DTI [1990] 2 AC 418, 500.    
13 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2009] AC 453 at [44].   
14 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513.    
15 Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643.  
16 The distinction between abeyance and frustration is valuably analysed by R. Craig: ‘Casting Aside 
Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative, Statute and Article 50 after the EU Referendum’ (2016) 79(6) 
MLR 1041.  
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However, there were other aspects of Miller that pushed perceptions of it the opposite 
direction, making it appear a further stepping stone in the advance of judicial power.  It did, 
after all, concern judicial review of the ‘foreign affairs’ prerogative, under which it is well-
accepted that the Executive has power to enter into and withdraw from treaties. The 
starting point here is that ‘the conduct of foreign affairs, including the making of treaties is 
still considered to be beyond the reach of judicial review’.17 Hence Miller might appear to be 
part of ‘the drift towards ever more searching judicial review of ever more previously non-
justiciable matters’,18 especially since it concerned the formal opening of negotiations 
between the British Government and an international organisation – the EU. Before Miller 
was decided, the fear was expressed that, were the courts to rule against the British 
Government in the case, this would risk not just its international embarrassment but also 
serious interference with ‘its ability to conduct…fruitful negotiations with foreign 
governments or international organisations’, specifically its freedom ‘to choose the moment 
that in its view was the most propitious one to start the exit process’.19 It was concerns like 
this that led to ‘widespread scepticism about whether the courts had the grounds to 
intervene, and if they did whether they would have the courage to do so’.20   
A further reason for caution was evident: as discussed below, in an area as intensely 
controversial as Brexit, and particularly after the decision to withdraw had been made via a 
nationwide referendum, any intrusion by the courts might be seen as treading on 
Parliament’s toes.21 As a sovereign legislature, Parliament could, at least in theory, impose 
whatever controls it wished upon the Executive’s ability to commence the exit process; and 
                                                          
17 R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, at [237] (per Lord Kerr). Since 
CCSU v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, courts have affirmed that, prima facie, the exercise of 
prerogative powers may be subject to review. However, this advance was ‘substantially hollowed 
out by the long list of prerogatives that were said to be non-justiciable’, including the making of 
treaties, prerogative of mercy and defence of the realm, although subsequent case-law made some 
modest inroads into those ‘forbidden areas’: M. Elliott, ‘Judicial Power and the United Kingdom’s 
Changing Constitution’ in this volume [ADD DETAILS AT PROOF STAGE] 
18 R. Ekins, The Dynamics of Judicial Power in the New British Constitution’, 1 February 2017, at 17; 
available http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Ekins-text-final.pdf  
19 G. Phillipson, ‘A Dive into Deep Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament’, 
[2016] MLR 70(6) 1064, 1079. Subsequent events proved these fears largely groundless.  
20 KD Ewing, ‘Editor's Introduction’(2016) 27(3) King's Law Journal, 289.  
21 In R v Her Majesty’s Treasury, ex p Smedley [1985] QB 657, 666, Sir John Donaldson remarked that 
‘It behoves the courts to be ever sensitive to the paramount need to refrain from trespassing upon 
the province of Parliament or, so far as this can be avoided, even appearing to do so’.   
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as a democratic legislature, it would naturally wish to respect the wishes of the people 
expressed in a referendum it itself had authorised. It was likely a combination of some or all 
of these considerations that led most political constitutionalists to rally to the banner of the 
prerogative and support the Government side.  
On the other hand, the case did not appear to concern what is perhaps the core 
concern of political constitutionalists: policy decisions being taken out of the hands of 
democratic decision-makers and placed in the hands of judges.22 The court was only being 
asked, in a sense, to choose between the two democratic branches of government. 
Moreover, as is well known, at least one leading political constitutionalist – Adam Tomkins - 
has expressed active hostility towards the whole notion of prerogative powers. For the 
prerogative is, of course, a residue of royal power. Hence the prerogative powers have 
never been granted by any deliberate or democratic decision to the Executive. Instead they 
have been, in effect, inherited by Ministers from the residual powers of an unelected 
heredity Monarch.  Tomkins has argued that, ‘Government should possess only those 
powers which the people, through their elected representatives in Parliament 
have…conferred on it by statute’23 and proposed therefore that prerogative powers should 
be abolished wholesale and replaced by modern statutory powers, whose extent and limits 
would be determined by Parliament.  This then was one reason why the strong support of 
most political constitutionalists for the Government side might appear something of a 
puzzle.  
Moreover, supporting the Government side meant prima facie supporting the notion 
that the Prime Minister, exercising her prerogative powers, could set in train a series of 
events that would cause a huge corpus of law—including a very substantial body of rights 
enjoyed and enforceable in UK domestic law, covering employment law, equal pay, 
environmental law, discrimination law and so on—to simply evaporate.24 And such an 
outcome seems contrary to the well established principle set out above that the prerogative 
                                                          
22 N. Aroney and B. Saunders, ‘On Judicial Rascals and Self-Appointed Monarchs: The Rise of Judicial 
Power in Australia’ at 000. [INSERT DETAILS AT PROOF STAGE].  
23 Our Republican Constitution (Hart, 2005) p.132. 
24 This was because, under Article 50(3) the EU Treaties would cease to apply to the UK two years 
after Article 50 was triggered (unless the period was extended by unanimous agreement of all 28 
member states) and with them, the whole corpus of EU law.  
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does not extend to changing domestic law or removing rights enjoyed in domestic law. 
Moreover, while the defence of a strong and effective Executive branch may be seen as an 
aspect of political constitutionalism,25 it does not follow that executive power should be 
elevated over the rights of the individual given effect by statute. 
This then is the concern of this article: to explore what could account for this 
enthusiastic support by political constitutionalists for an outcome that, on the face of it, 
appeared to favour the royal prerogative over rights given effect by parliamentary statute. 
Its purpose therefore is not to analyse the detailed doctrinal controversies around Miller – 
something I have done elsewhere.26 Rather it is to consider some of the possible reasons 
why political constitutionalists were drawn to defend use of the prerogative in this case.  
 The article proceeds in four main steps. It first considers a preliminary objection to 
the claimant’s case - one that suggested this was all a fuss about nothing, given Parliament’s 
likely future role in legislating for Brexit. It then considers what it characterises as two 
broad-brush arguments favouring the Government side: the importance of the referendum 
result and Parliament’s ability itself to control the Executive without judicial assistance. It 
argues that, while certainly evoking values of democracy and political accountability that are 
core to political constitutionalism, both ultimately fail to establish their relevance to the 
specific issue disputed in Miller. The article proffers instead an alternative means for the 
significance of the referendum to be constitutionally recognised. It then moves on to 
consider the two key legal arguments of the Government: those based on the De Keyser’s 
principle and the alleged conditionality of EU law rights in domestic law. It does so through 
the same lens of legal-political constitutionalism. Finally, it considers through the same lens 
a specific issue in relation to which Miller may be argued to have changed our 
understanding of the constitution – the notion of ‘constitutional statutes’, commonly 
understood to be immune from implied repeal.   
 
                                                          
25 Timothy Endicott’s energetic and scholarly defence of the legitimacy of prerogative powers (‘The 
Stubborn Stain Theory of Executive Power’ (Policy Exchange, 2016)) to my mind amounts to a 
defence of executive powers, in general, rather than specifically prerogative powers.  
26 See G. Phillipson, ‘EU Law as an Agent of National Constitutional Change: Miller v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union’ [2017] Yearbook of European Law 1-48.  
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II. ANTICIPATING OR IGNORING PARLIAMENT’S FUTURE ROLE IN BREIXT? 
 
We noted above that the core claimant argument in Miller: that the inevitable result 
of triggering Article 50 would be that a whole set of citizens’ EU-law rights would disappear 
into thin air. One obvious reply to this concern is that this characterisation ignored the 
obvious fact that Parliament was always going to be involved in the process of Brexit. It 
would, at some point in the process, legislate both to repeal the European Communities Act 
1972 (‘ECA’), which gives effect to EU law in the UK, and to retain many of those rights. That 
indeed is what is happening now with the immensely complex European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017-2019, before Parliament at the time of writing. Once passed, this 
legislation will repeal the ECA and incorporate nearly all existing applicable EU law into UK 
law. Assuming this happens before the UK actually leaves the EU, at first sight, it would 
provide an answer both to the argument that the purpose of the ECA will be frustrated by 
withdrawal and that our EU-law rights will disappear wholesale.27 As Adam Tomkins put it:  
‘triggering Article 50 will not dilute or diminish anyone’s statutory rights…What 
happens to [our EU law] rights and obligations…will be a matter for Parliament to 
determine in due course.’28 
This was the argument that became known as ‘sequencing’ when run by the Government in 
the Divisional Court. But there are two main responses to it. First there is a category of 
rights that will inevitably be lost by exit,29 whatever form it takes. These include notably the 
right to stand and vote in elections to the European Parliament.30 But second, even in 
relation to the rights that Parliament was always likely to legislate to retain, the 
                                                          
27 See e.g. Phillipson, note 19 above, at 1085; M. Gordon, ‘The UK's Sovereignty Situation: Brexit, 
Bewilderment and Beyond’ (2016) 27(3) King's Law Journal, 333, 339.  
28 A. Tomkins, ‘Brexit, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (5 November 2016) available at 
https://notesfromnorthbritain.wordpress.com/2016/11/05/brexit-democracy-and-the-rule-of-law/ 
29 The first category was those rights that would be lost but which could be converted into purely 
domestic law rights; the second was those that could only be replaced with the agreement of other 
states – e.g. free movement rights. The loss of EU-law rights is explicitly conceded by the 
Government’s case on appeal: R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union UKSC 2016/196: Printed Case of the Appellant, at 62[a]. 
30 Guaranteed under the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002.   
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Government rightly lost the ‘sequencing’ argument in the Divisional Court. For it was met 
with the simple but devastating rejoinder that the Government cannot defend a course of 
action that would be unlawful as things stand with the plea that Parliament will later enact 
legislation that will cure or avoid the illegality.31 Indeed the problem with the ‘sequencing’ 
argument is illustrated by considering Lord Carnwath’s rather tentative invocation of it in his 
dissent. Noting the Secretary of State’s assurance that there would be legislation to 
‘reproduce existing European-based rights in domestic law’32 he said that ‘on the 
assumption that such a Bill becomes law by the time of withdrawal’, there would be no 
breach of the rule that actions taken under the prerogative may not alter domestic law. He 
then concedes that ‘of course that result depends on the will of Parliament: it is not in the 
gift of the executive’ – which might be thought fatal to the argument he has just made. Yet 
he adds ‘there is no basis for making the opposite assumption’33 (that is, the Parliament will 
not pass the relevant legislation). But, with respect, a court cannot make any assumption 
about what Parliament will do, based on representations by the Government.34 In the Fire 
Brigades Union case, the contention that the legislative scheme frustrated by a contrary use 
of the prerogative would be repealed at some later date was rightly rejected as irrelevant by 
the House of Lords.35 A court quite simply should not even enter into the enquiry about 
whether Parliament will, or will not, act in future. As the majority put it: ‘That is a matter for 
Parliament to decide in due course’. The court’s role is simple: to resolve the matter ‘in 
accordance with the law as it stands’.36 Were it otherwise, a court could always be 
                                                          
31 As the majority put it in the Supreme Court, while ‘it is intended’ that ‘the Great Repeal Bill’ will 
repeal the ECA 1972 and ‘convert existing EU law into domestic law’, ‘ministers’ intentions are not 
law, and the courts cannot proceed on the assumption that they will necessarily become law’. 
 (Miller at [34] and [35]).  
32ibid at [262].  
33 Ibid at [264].  
34 I am referring to the situation in which a court is considering the lawfulness of proposed Executive 
action; the position may be different where a court is considering merely what remedy to award. 
E.g. in Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 (HL) the court considered that the likelihood of 
Parliament remedying the incompatibility legislatively was a reason for issuing a declaration of 
incompatibility under s 4 of the Human Rights Act, rather than re-interpreting the incompatible 
legislation under s 3.  
35 Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Fire Brigades 
Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 552.  
36 Miller at [34] and [35].  
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dissuaded from a finding of ultra vires by the argument that Parliament would doubtless 
legislate in future to supply the legal basis currently lacking.37 
This leaves us with four main arguments on the Government side. Two I characterise 
as broad-brush constitutional arguments, based on democratic reasoning, which might be 
thought to hold an obvious prima facie appeal to political constitutionalists; two are tightly 
legal-doctrinal.  
III. TWO BROAD-BRUSH DEMOCRATIC ARGUMENTS  
A. The constitutional significance of the referendum  
 
The first argument concerns the constitutional, and potentially the legal, significance of the 
EU referendum. Many commentators, including myself,38 thought that the referendum 
result must make some kind of difference to the permissibility of using the prerogative to 
trigger Article 50. The argument was that in the classic cases concerning clashes of 
prerogative and statute - Fire Brigades Union, Laker Airways39 and De Keyser’s - the 
Executive was using its prerogative powers simply to further its own policies, and in doing so 
overriding or evading the will of Parliament as expressed in legislation. But that was not the 
case here. The Government was giving effect to the result of a huge democratic exercise: 
the 2016 referendum. Moreover, the legal basis for the referendum had been provided in 
legislation recently passed by Parliament itself.40  
Commentary on Miller gives the impression that many contributors to the debate 
felt that the referendum should therefore have a bearing on the outcome,41 but that they 
often struggled to articulate exactly how it should figure as a legal argument. This was 
                                                          
37 The majority quoted and applied dicta from Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Fire Brigades Union 
case that, ‘it was inappropriate for ministers to base their actions (or to invite the court to make any 
decision) on the basis of an anticipated repeal of a statutory provision as that would involve 
ministers (or the court) pre-empting Parliament’s decision whether to enact that repeal.’ (Miller at 
[51]).  
38 Phillipson, note 19 above, at 1087.  
39 Laker Airways v Department of Trade [1977] QB 643.  
40 European Union Referendum Act 2015. 
41 See R. Ekins, ‘Constitutional practice and principle in the article 50 litigation’ (2007) 133(Jul) LQR 
347, 348.  
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reflected in the way that Government counsel when arguing the case constantly referred to 
the referendum result – but appeared unclear as to its precise legal relevance.42 One 
commentator suggested that it figure as a broader constitutional argument, but not a 
strictly legal one.43 Mark Elliott argued that:  
A bald, prerogative-based constitutional power grab by the executive at the expense 
of Parliament is one thing. But the constitutional offensiveness of using prerogative 
power in the circumstances with which Miller was concerned cannot sensibly be 
evaluated without reference to the fact that such power would have been being 
deployed so as to implement the outcome of a referendum …which, in the first 
place, had been provided for by Parliament through primary legislation.44 
But Elliott does not go on to explain exactly how the referendum could figure in the legal 
evaluation of the case; and in fact his (and Richard Ekins’s) key arguments for the 
Government side do not depend at all on the referendum and would apply regardless of it.45 
Adam Tomkins similarly criticises the Divisional Court’s failure to grapple with the 
referendum result as ‘a stark omission’,46 but again makes no attempt to suggest what its 
precise legal relevance could be. Only Forsyth made the tentative suggestion that 2015 Act 
authorising the referendum could be seen as Parliament having ‘impliedly delegated the 
power’ to make the withdrawal decision to the people. But he admitted that it would ‘[i]t 
would require a bold judge to adopt’,47 such a reading of the Act, given its complete silence 
                                                          
42 In the Supreme Court, the majority noted that, ‘in answer to a question from the Court, [lead 
counsel for the Government] adopted a suggestion that, even if Parliamentary authority would 
otherwise have been required, the 2015 Act and the subsequent referendum dispensed with that 
requirement, but he did not develop that argument, in our view realistically’ (Miller at [38], emphasis 
added). 
43 M. Barcentewicz, ‘What is the Government Really Arguing in the Article 50 Litigation?: A Response 
to Mark Elliott’, Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project (5th October 2016).  
https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/mikolaj-barczentewicz-what-is-the-government-really-arguing-
in-the-article-50-litigation-a-response-to-mark-elliott/ 
44 M. Elliott, ‘The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional Principle’ 
(2017) 76(2) CLJ 257, 282.  
45 As discussed below at 000-000.  
46 https://notesfromnorthbritain.wordpress.com/2016/11/05/brexit-democracy-and-the-rule-of-
law/ 
47 C. Forsyth, ‘The High Court’s Miller Judgment’, Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project (8 
November 2016). https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/christopher-forsyth-the-high-courts-miller-
judgment/. Gordon, note  27 above, at 338 also refers to Parliament having ‘passed power to the 
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on the legal consequences of a vote either way. The general political constitutionalist 
objection to such ‘bold readings’ of legislation by activist judges48 – which Forsyth strongly 
shares – perhaps explains the rather tentative nature of this suggestion.  
Overall, while it was generally agreed that the referendum result could not be 
treated as legally binding, given the failure of the 2015 Act to prescribe any consequences of 
the outcome of the vote, there appeared to be some unease with the idea of the court in 
Miller finding the result to be wholly irrelevant. And indeed the rather cursory treatment of 
the referendum by the Divisional Court49 put an unfortunate complexion on that Court’s 
quotation of Dicey that ‘the judges know nothing of any “will of the people”’50 it almost 
gave the impression that the judges were wilfully ignoring the referendum. Surely the fact 
that the result was not made binding did not mean that it should be treated as legally 
irrelevant?   
B. The second broad-brush argument: Parliament does not need the courts’ 
intervention 
 
This second argument characterises Miller as being about whether Parliament should be 
consulted or have ‘a say over’ whether and when Article 50 is triggered – and then robustly 
responds that Parliament can have whatever role it wants in relation to this decision, 
without assistance from the courts. As Lord Reed put it in the Supreme Court, ‘it is for 
Parliament, not the courts, to determine the nature and extent of its involvement’.51 Unlike 
the referendum argument, this did figure strongly in the dissenting judgments in Miller – 
and indeed Paul Daly has described the division of opinion on this argument as a ‘fault-
line’52 between reliance on ‘political accountability’ (emphasised by the dissenters, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
electorate to decide whether to remain or leave the EU’, but I assume this refers to political, rather 
than legal power. 
48 See e.g. the highly critical commentary by Forsyth (with Ekins) on the bold ‘reading-down’ of the 
statutory ministerial veto in R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21; R. Ekins and C. Forsyth, 
Judging the Public Interest: The Rule of Law vs the Rule of Judges (Policy Exchange, 2015).  
49 In which it merely noted, in three short paragraphs that it was ‘advisory’: R (Miller) v Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768, [2017] 1 All E.R. 158.  
50 The quote of course concludes with ‘….except as expressed in legislation’: ibid, at [22].  
51 Miller at [262].  
52 P. Daly, ‘Brexit: Legal and Political Fault Lines’ Public Law 2017, Nov Supp (Brexit Special Extra 
Issue 2017), 73. 
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especially Lord Reed and Lord Carnwarth) and the ‘legal accountability’ (emphasised by the 
majority).  This division is of course also one common way of expressing the difference 
between legal and political constitutionalism.   
Arguments in favour of relying on political accountability in Miller were advanced by 
several authors. I suggested that while ‘the Government should not take a step as 
momentous as triggering Art 50 without in some way seeking the approval and consent of 
the Commons’, this was ‘a general principle of constitutional morality, the operation of 
which should be worked out between the two democratic branches’;53 there was no need 
for the courts to intervene. Timothy Endicott similarly noted that, ‘Parliament has 
[a]…central role in…Brexit, and it was already carrying it out…through debate and scrutiny in 
both Houses…and the confidence of the Commons in Theresa May’s Government.’’54 Mike 
Gordon notes that ‘Parliament has been heavily involved’ in the decision on Brexit, ‘most 
significantly’ by enacting the 2015 Referendum Act’ and concludes that, while ‘[i]t is 
absolutely right—indeed, vital—that Parliament should debate and scrutinise the 
government’s plans for the withdrawal negotiations’, that role did not require legislation.55 
Similarly Lord Reed, in dissent, noted that ‘there has been considerable Parliamentary 
scrutiny’ of the issue including, in particular, the motion of 7 December 2016, in which the 
Commons expressly ‘call[ed] on the Government to invoke Article 50 by 31 March 2017’.56 
In other words, if Miller was about whether Parliament should ‘approve’ the triggering of 
Article 50, then two arguments would appear to follow: first how it did so was a matter for 
Parliament, not the courts; second Parliament had already expressly approved the invoking 
of Article 50, at least by the time the Supreme Court was hearing the case, in December 
2016.  
It is Lord Carnwarth’s dissent which makes the most of this argument, by drawing a 
parallel with the Fire Brigades Union case (‘FBU’).57 In FBU, the House of Lords held 3-2 that 
use of the prerogative to introduce a new scheme for criminal injuries compensation was 
                                                          
53  Phillipson, note 19 above, at 1079.  
54 Endicott, note 25 above, at 23.  
55  Gordon, note 27 above, 338, 339.  
56 Miller at [162] 
57 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513, 567, per 
Lord Mustill.  
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unlawful because it frustrated the intention of Parliament that the Minister decide when 
(but not whether) to introduce an inconsistent legislative scheme that had been passed but 
not yet brought into force. The dissenters in that case regarded the decision as ‘a most 
improper intrusion into a field which lies peculiarly within the province of Parliament’,58 a 
criticism which Tomkins vigorously endorsed, portraying the decision as turning on a stark 
choice between legal and political forms of accountability and thus rival versions of 
constitutionalism.59 Lord Carnwarth analyses Miller as likewise inviting the courts to 
intervene unnecessarily in the relationship between Parliament and Government, and on a 
hugely controversial political issue. And, like several academic commentators, he refers to 
the fact of Parliament having legislated for the referendum itself in order to refute the 
notion that the Executive was ‘foisting on Parliament’ the irreversible triggering of Article 
50.60 Noting in particular the December 2016 motion, in which the Commons expressly 
called for the triggering of Art 50, he concludes that ‘the formality of legislation is 
unnecessary to enable Parliament to fulfil its ordinary responsibility for scrutinising the 
government.’61   
Seen in this way, Miller would be just another example of what Ekins critically notes 
as one ‘rationalisation’ for the expansion of judicial review, namely that ‘Executive 
domination of Parliament warranted a more assertive and intrusive role on the part of 
courts’.62 In other words, Miller could be seen as the courts rushing in to tame a Brexit-
hungry Government because they did not trust Parliament to do the job properly – a picture 
of the case that would certainly rally political constitutionalists against it. One commentator 
indeed went so far as to suggest that the case entailed ‘questioning Parliament’s capacity or 
willingness’ to perform its ordinary functions and the court ‘telling Parliament how they 
should be done’, something that would be contrary to the fundamental constitutional 
principle of Parliament’s exclusive cognisance over its own proceedings.63  
                                                          
58 Lord Keith, ibid at 544, quoted by Lord Carwarth in Miller, at [250].  
59 A. Tomkins Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003) 28-30.  
60 Miller, at [272].  
61 Miller, at [255].  
62 Ekins, note 18 above, at 3.  
63 As set out in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 (Sir Stephen Laws, ‘Questioning Parliament in the 
Courts?’, Policy Exchange’s Judicial Power Project  (25 January 2017) available at 
http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/sir-stephen-laws-questioning-parliament-in-the-courts/). This is a 
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My view now is that all the above arguments miss something fundamental about the 
case. They rely, consciously or unconsciously, on a mischaracterisation of what Miller was 
actually about.  
C. The answer to both broad-brush arguments: Miller was a vires case 
Discussions of Miller64 and in particular much media reporting during, before and 
after the case65 often misrepresented it,  presenting it as being variously about whether the 
Government had to ‘consult’ MPs about the triggering of Article 50, or ‘seek Parliament’s 
approval’ for doing so. Such descriptions obscure the most fundamental and vital fact about 
Miller: that it was, at its simplest, a question of vires – of whether the Executive had the 
legal power to initiate withdrawal from the EU, given the claimed dramatic effect this would 
have on domestic law. I now think that it is impossible to get a clear picture of what was at 
stake in this case without understanding this fundamental point. Thus the claimants were 
not arguing that Parliament should ‘approve’ or ‘be consulted’ about the triggering of Article 
50: neither such contention would be any business of the judges. They were arguing that 
the Government lacked legal power under the prerogative to commence withdrawal from 
the EU. If they were right about that, then the only way for the Government to obtain that 
legal power was through fresh primary legislation. Thus the legal question in Miller was one 
of the most basic the courts must decide in any state in which government, like the people, 
is subject to the rule of law: does the government have the legal power to do the act it 
proposes to do?  
What is the significance of this for the arguments considered so far? It shows, first, 
that even under the most minimalist account of the rule of law, the question in Miller was 
properly one for judicial determination.66 This was no case of judicial adventurism. It did not 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
fundamental mischaracterisation of Miller: the judgments did not ‘tell Parliament’ to do anything: 
they merely found the Executive currently lacked legal power to trigger Article 50. If every finding of 
ultra vires were to be interpreted as ‘telling Parliament to pass legislation’ to provide the legal basis 
found lacking, and hence as breaching Article 9, then the courts would be barred from enforcing 
even the most minimal version of the rule of law.  
64 E.g. Ewing at one point summarises Miller as laying down a ‘requirement that there should be 
parliamentary approval to trigger Article 50’ (Ewing, note 8 above, at 712). The rest of the article 
makes clear that the issue was legal basis not approval.  
65 See e.g.  https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/11/since-article-50-was-triggered-a-no-deal-brexit-
has-been-the-default/ 12 Nov 2017.  
66 As nearly all critics of the case agreed: see e.g. Tomkins, note 28 above.   
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concern judicial review of the manner of exercise of the prerogative power but only of the 
‘logically prior’ question of its extent:67 whether its scope included the triggering of Article 
50, given the well-established principle that the prerogative could not be used to alter 
domestic law or remove rights enjoyed in domestic law.  
While this basic point about Miller is of course generally understood, its significance 
for the two ‘broad-brush’ arguments has not always been fully recognised.  For if ultra vires 
is used as the lens through which to view the case then a key conclusion comes sharply into 
focus: neither of the two broad-brush arguments can go to the specific legal issue it raised. 
If the issue is whether the Government has the legal power to trigger Article 50, then the 
fact that Parliament can question, scrutinise, or even take control of the process becomes 
simply irrelevant. One cannot excuse an action contrary to law – an act that lacks a legal 
basis - by arguing that Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for it. Acceptance of such 
a view would drive a coach and horses not only through the ultra vires principle, but also the 
deeper constitutional principle it instantiates: the rule of law. Thus the case concerned not 
the necessity for obtaining Parliament’s approval for the government policy of leaving the 
EU – something which is indeed merely a ‘a general principle of constitutional morality’68 - 
but the need for legislation, to render lawful what would otherwise be unlawful. This also 
reveals that the cautionary judicial adjuration cited by Lord Carnwarth - that parliamentary 
scrutiny, not judicial review, is the best way of ensuring that ‘the executive…performs in a 
way which Parliament finds appropriate’, because ‘it is the task of Parliament and the 
executive… not of the courts, to govern the country’69 - was in fact irrelevant. The issue was 
not whether the executive was ‘performing appropriately’, but whether it was proposing to 
act unlawfully; meanwhile the courts were being asked not to help ‘govern the country’ but 
to perform the quintessentially judicial task of elucidating the necessary legal basis for a 
crucially important action the Executive proposed to take.  
The same reasoning also makes clear that the referendum result cannot go to the 
key legal issue in the case. The majority in Miller says simply: 
                                                          
67 Bancoult (No.2) [2008] UKHL 61; [2009] 1 A.C. 453 at [143].  
68 Phillipson, note 19 above, at 1079.  
69 Per Lord Mustill in Fire Brigades Union (at 567) cited by Lord Carnwarth, Miller at [252].  
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‘Where, as in this case, implementation of a referendum result requires a change in 
the law of the land, and statute has not provided for that change, the change in the 
law must be made in the only way in which the UK constitution permits, namely 
through Parliamentary legislation.’70 
Similarly, Lord Hughes in dissent notes briefly that ‘[n]o-one suggests that the referendum 
by itself has the legal effect that a Government notice to leave the EU is made lawful’.71   
One early suggestion made was that the democratic mandate given by the 
referendum to the Executive meant that ‘the normative concern typically generated by the 
Executive’s use of prerogative powers’ to override, frustrate or evade Parliament’s intention 
as expressed in legislation was arguably ‘absent in this particular case’. And that the courts 
could therefore perhaps conclude that the normal prohibition against such use of the 
prerogative was ‘not applicable on this novel set of facts’.72 However I now regard this 
suggestion as one that, like others, failed fully to appreciate that the issue here was lack of 
power. Once this is understood, it becomes plain that the referendum result couldn’t go to 
whether the Government possessed the legal power to commence withdrawal. If the 
prerogative is unavailable because it would remove legal rights or change domestic law 
then, quite simply, there is no power. The Government cannot magic a power out of thin air 
by saying, in effect: ‘Ah, but there was a referendum.’ 
Moreover, one can accept this conclusion without consigning the referendum result 
to legal irrelevance. While it cannot properly go to the existence of a power to withdraw 
from the EU, it could – at least in theory – go to a challenge to the exercise of that power.73 
The majority described as ‘a bold suggestion’ the notion that the exercise – as opposed to 
the applicability - of the treaty prerogative could be reviewable,74 but it is possible to 
imagine extreme examples in which a court might contemplate it. For example, imagine that 
the ‘Remain’ side had won the referendum but the Government had decided to withdraw 
the UK from the EU anyway. It is at least possible that, in those extreme circumstances, an 
                                                          
70 Miller, at [121].  
71 Ibid, at [275].  
72See also ‘D.R. Wingfield, ‘The Brexit case: does the Constitution Have a Place for Democracy?’ 
(2016) 35(2) Queensland LR 343, 348.  
73See Daly, note 52 above, at 84  
74 Miller at [92].  
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action based either on Wednesbury or even, conceivably, frustration of substantive 
legitimate expectations (generated by the promise to implement the referendum result) 
might have succeeded. This provides at least a possible path away from the complete legal 
irrelevance of the referendum. But while it points to a possible legal role for the plebiscite, it 
is only a tentative and speculative one; and, importantly also, not one that could have 
applied in Miller itself. A more substantive answer seems called for.  
D. Affording the referendum constitutional significance: a new convention?  
While the idea that an event of such immense importance as the EU referendum 
could be treated as devoid of legal significance is troubling, more worrying still is the notion 
that Miller – and the vitriolic reaction to it in some quarters – revealed a dangerous gap to 
have opened up between the legal view of the referendum and the popular (or political 
view) of it. Not only did the courts find that the referendum was not relevant to the narrow 
issue they had to decide, it was also frequently described by lawyerly Remainers as ‘only 
advisory’ – a description which, taken literally, seemed to conceive of the referendum 
purely as a form of ‘advice’ to those who would take the real decision – the politicians.  
The trouble is that this was emphatically not the popular or general perception of 
the referendum. As many have pointed out, the Government sent a leaflet, paid for by 
public funds, to every house in the country, which said:  
‘The referendum on Thursday, 23rd June is your chance to decide if we should 
remain in or leave the European Union. ‘This is your decision. The Government will 
implement what you decide.’75  
The echoed what the then Foreign Secretary had said, when introducing the Referendum 
Bill into Parliament: ‘the decision about our [EU] membership should be taken by the British 
people, not by…Government Ministers or parliamentarians.’76 Thus no-one during the 
referendum campaign was saying that the whole exercise was really just a giant opinion poll 
                                                          
75Available: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517014/EU_refer
endum_leaflet_large_print.pdf 
76 See https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-simple-but-vital-piece-of-legislation-to-deliver-
on-our-promise-to-give-the-british-people-the-final-say-on-our-eu-membership. 
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- there to give politicians an idea of public opinion on the matter; but only in order to help 
them decide whether to Leave or Remain.   
Thus my contention is that Miller and some of the furious reaction to it revealed that 
a dangerous gap had opened up between the popular perception of who was deciding the 
issue of withdrawal (the people, through the referendum) and the elite, ‘insider’, legal view 
(that the real decision remained one for the institutions of government: either Parliament or 
the Executive). The gap was between the legal reality and the political reality. And it may 
have been partly that gap that fuelled the extraordinary explosion of rage that greeted the 
first Miller decision,77 including repeated accusations by senior Conservative and UKIP 
politicians and large sections of the press that the judges were trying to block Brexit78 and 
extraordinary levels of public opprobrium being heaped on Gina Miller, including numerous 
threats of serious violence.79  
As noted above, one possible response to this intuition of a dangerous gap is to 
argue that it could be closed with legal doctrine. However as discussed above, it is very hard 
to see how the particular legal dispute in Miller could satisfactorily accommodate the 
referendum result as a matter of doctrine: and, as we saw above, while many argued for the 
relevance of the referendum to the case, there was very little by way of concrete doctrinal 
suggestion as to what exactly such an argument would be. So the question then becomes, as 
Wingfield has put, ‘how the results of referendums can be afforded ‘constitutional 
significance’ even if they cannot be given strictly legal significance.80 At this point one might 
ask: what is the usual way in which the UK constitution resolves gaps between legal doctrine 
and political reality? How does it afford constitutional significance to values that the law 
cannot enforce?  
The answer of course is: through constitutional conventions. As many commentators 
have pointed out, one of the key functions of conventions is precisely ‘to bridge gaps 
                                                          
77 See also Emerton and Crawford: ‘Parliament, the People and Interpreting the Law: R (Miller) v 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union’ (2016) Queensland LR 35(2) 331,340.  
78 A summary and critique of the press and political reaction may be found at 
https://theconversation.com/enemies-of-the-people-mps-and-press-gang-up-on-the-constitution-
over-high-court-brexit-ruling-68241 
79 See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/aug/09/gina-miller-afraid-to-leave-her-
home-after-threats-of-acid-attacks 
80 Above, note 72 at 347.  
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between legal positions that may be no longer normatively acceptable and a compelling 
political reality’.81 Aileen McHarg has referred to this as the functions conventions have in 
softening the impact of hard-law norms, making them acceptable in a contemporary context 
through governing the manner of its exercise.82 As she points out, this softening function of 
conventions has long applied to the exercise of legislative power by Parliament itself. Thus it 
is by a long-standing convention that the legally unlimited power of the Westminster 
Parliament to legislate for the self-governing overseas Dominions and territories was 
restrained so that such legislation was not imposed unasked for.83 More recently, the Sewel 
Convention squared the legal reality of the unlimited sovereignty of the Westminster 
Parliament with the political imperative to grant Scotland a real and strong measure of 
devolution whereby Scotland controls her own affairs in the areas devolved without 
interference from Westminster.84 Thus as Mike Gordon reminds us:  
the entire justification for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, and the legally 
unlimited legislative power which it allocates to the UK Parliament, is premised on 
the fact that this power is constitutionally limited, just not by law.85 
This paper therefore contends that if the UK is to continue using referendums – 
which seems likely86 – it is time to consider whether a convention should now be recognised 
to the effect that parliament and government will abide by the results of referendums.87  
Detailed consideration of the case for such a convention, both normative and analytical, 
must await another day. For now it will suffice to briefly consider whether the famous 
‘Jennings test’ for the existence of conventions might be satisfied. That test, it will be 
                                                          
81 See e.g. Elliott and Thomas, Public Law (2016, 3rd ed) at 62. An obvious example is the convention 
whereby the Queen’s prerogative powers are exercised on her behalf by Ministers.   
82 A. McHarg, ‘Reforming the United Kingdom Constitution: Law, Convention, Soft Law’ (2008) 71(6) 
MLR 853.  
83 Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th ed. 1974), VI, para. 1027; Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [I969] 
1 A.C. 645, esp. at 723. 
84 For discussion of the issue of Sewel in Miller, see Jo Murkens, ‘Mixed Messages in Bottles: the 
European Union, devolution, and the future of the constitution’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 685, 690–94.  
85 Gordon, note 27 above, at 337.  
86 Others have suggested that a separate convention might be needed to govern when referendums 
should be called: see e.g. P. Leyland, ‘Referendums, Popular Sovereignty and the Territorial 
Constitution’ in Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland, and Alison Young (eds), Sovereignty and the Law: 
Domestic, European and International Perspectives (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 145.   
87 Such a convention would of course be moot where the enabling legislation itself specified its legal 
consequences, as with the AV Referendum in 2011.  
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recalled, requires first, the existence of ‘precedents’; second that the actors in the 
precedents believed that they were ‘bound by a rule’, and third, the need for a good ‘reason 
for the rule’.88 Plainly there are numerous precedents: in every referendum held in the UK in 
the post-war period, the result has been respected.89 The reason for such a rule would be 
obvious: that the whole purpose of holding a referendum in the first place is to obtain a 
direct democratic mandate for a constitutional change so important that it is felt that mere 
legislation will not suffice.90 Having held a referendum, it would then be unconscionable, as 
well as undemocratic,91 not to implement its results:92 doing so would likely also provoke a 
major political crisis. The argument that the political actors involved in the above 
precedents considered themselves to be ‘bound by a rule’ is harder to make out and would 
require detailed consideration. For now, it may be observed only that it is plain that all 
political actors in the recent referendums did regard themselves as bound to abide by the 
result. This was made particularly clear in the aftermath of the EU referendum. It is well 
known that there was a strong majority of MPs in the Commons for ‘Remain’; however the 
voting record makes clear that nearly all MPs plainly regarded themselves as bound to 
implement the result of the referendum, even where they passionately disagreed with it.93 
They thus appeared to recognise a powerful norm binding on them.  
 It is suggested therefore that there is now a prima facie case for the recognition of a 
convention that Parliament and Government should generally abide by the results of any 
                                                          
88 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, (5th ed, 1959), at 136. 
89Examples include: the 1973 referendum on continued membership of the then EEC, the devolution 
referendums in Northern Ireland (1998) Scotland (1997) and Wales (1997 and 2011); the Alternative 
Vote Referendum (2011) re a possible change in the electoral system for General Elections; the 
Scottish Independence Referendum (2014) and the EU Referendum itself in 2016.  
90 See V Bogdanor, ‘Brexit, the Constitution and the Alternatives’ (2016) 27(3) King's Law Journal 
314.  
91 See Wingfield, note 72 above, at 347.  
92 There might be the need for exceptions to develop over time to cover e.g. a major change of 
circumstances, or findings of significant irregularity in the conduct of the referendum.  
93 The December 2016 Motion approving the triggering of Article 50 discussed above was passed by 
448 votes to 75; the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 passed its Second 
Reading in the Commons by 498 to 114 votes. MPs who voted against either made clear that they 
were doing so not because they were seeking to frustrate the result of the referendum, but rather 
because they did not believe the Government had set out satisfactory plans for the UK’s ‘divorce 
agreement’ with the EU (particularly re the position of EU citizens living in the UK) or its future 
relationship with the block. Only a tiny handful, including the veteran Conservative Europhile, Ken 
Clarke, made clear that they would vote to block implementation of the referendum result, if 
possible.  
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official referendum. Such a convention would serve to bridge the gap Miller exposed 
between the legal and the popular view of the EU referendum.   
E. Conclusion on the broad-brush democratic arguments  
 
The above has sought to demonstrate that while there were arguments used about 
Miller that had a political-constitutionalist cast, closer analysis reveals that they could not 
bite on the central issue in the case. But a second related point is perhaps more important: 
those arguing for the Government side of the case did not in the end rely on arguments 
stemming from either the referendum or Parliament’s ability to control the Executive. As 
the next section will show, the crucial arguments deployed by the Government and its 
academic supporters when the case went to the Supreme Court concerned the construction 
of the ECA; and they logically entailed that the Government would have been legally free to 
withdraw from the EU at any time, regardless of the referendum.94 They did not need even 
to assert that Parliament would repeal  the ECA at the appropriate time: for under the 
arguments advanced, that statute would simply become ‘spent’ upon withdrawal. It would 
not be necessary to repeal it, precisely because it would become inert, in no longer having 
relevant EU law to bite on. That is one reason why I changed my own view of Miller: had 
there been a way of arguing it that directly tied the Government’s freedom to use the 
prerogative to the referendum result, that might have rendered use of the prerogative 
acceptable in those particular circumstances. But as the next section will show, the key 
doctrinal arguments used in the end had nothing to do with the referendum.   
IV. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT I: LIMIT THE CASE TO DE KEYSER’S 
In his elegant analysis of the competing syllogisms advanced in the Miller case, 
Aroney notes how each side tried to frame the case as centring on a different legal 
principle.95 As we have seen, the claimants argued that triggering Article 50 would lead 
                                                          
94 The only possible hindrance would have been the possibility of a judicial review challenging the 
rationality of a decision to withdraw: given the standard view that decisions taken under the foreign 
affairs prerogative are non-justiciable in this respect (see note 17 above), this possibility must be 
counted a remote one.  
95 N. Aroney, ‘R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union: Three Competing 
Syllogisms’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 685.   
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inevitably to the destruction of at least some EU-law rights given effect in domestic law by 
statute, thus changing domestic law, contrary to the general principle enunciated in 
Rayner.96 In contrast, the Government sought to frame the case as resting on the 
application of the De Keyser’s principle: that the foreign affairs prerogative empowered the 
Government to withdraw from the EU, unless legislation had actively abrogated that power, 
expressly or impliedly.  
The reason why the Government was so keen to persuade the court that De Keyser’s 
was the governing principle is clear. Had it been accepted that the applicable principle was 
‘the prerogative to withdraw subsists unless Parliament can be shown to have deliberately 
abrogated it’, then the Government would have won.97 It had only to point to the fact that 
there was no provision in any statute purporting to restrict – or even deal with – the 
decision to trigger Article 50,98 an omission made more striking by the fact that Parliament 
had put restrictions – including, by 2011, ‘referendum locks’99 – on a long list of other things 
that the Government might vote for or do in the EU.100  
The significance of this point for present purposes is this: had the Government been 
right that De Keyser’s was the relevant principle, then there was a possible political 
constitutionalist argument here. Finnis put it well by saying that the claimants were 
essentially trying to use the courts to impose a limit upon the use of Article 50 that 
Parliament had carefully refrained from imposing.101 Viewed that way, the case could be 
seen as illegitimately advancing judicial power over statute: the claimants were seeking to 
get the courts to, in effect, add a restriction upon the government that the relevant 
legislation had never contained.   
                                                          
96 Above, note 12.  
97 This is especially so given that courts have often suggested that Parliament needs to make its 
intention very clear in order thus to specifically abrogate an existing prerogative: see e.g. R v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552.  
98 This included in particular the European Union Amendment Act 2008, which added the Lisbon 
Treaty, including Article 50, to the list of treaties to which the ECA gives effect.  
99 By virtue of sections 2, 3 and 6 of the European Union Act 2011.  
100 A point also made by Gordon, note 27 above, at 338.   
101 ‘J. Finnis, ‘Brexit and the Balance of Our Constitution’ (Policy Exchange Website, 2016), available 
https://policyexchange.org.uk/judicial-power-project-john-finnis-on-brexit-and-the-balance-of-our-
constitution/ at 24).  
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The trouble with this argument is simply that De Keyser’s was not the relevant 
principle. The claimants had never argued that Parliament had ousted the prerogative to 
withdraw from the EU by specific provision in the ECA or elsewhere.102 Plainly it had not. 
Their argument was not that any particular provision in legislation had replaced or excluded 
the prerogative. It was that the general principle of law set out in Rayner - that the 
prerogative cannot be used to remove rights, change domestic law or frustrate the intention 
of any statute - precluded use of the prerogative in these circumstances. Despite its best 
efforts to steer the case away from the Rayner principle and onto the safer territory of De 
Keyser’s, the Government’s lawyers had to confront this argument in the end. And this is 
where, drawing heavily on commentary by Mark Elliott and John Finnis, they came up with 
their most clever and subtle counter-argument: that of conditionality and contingency.   
V. DOCTRINAL ARGUMENT II: EU LAW RIGHTS AS CONDITIONAL AND 
CONTINGENT 
As Elliott puts it: ‘The axiom that the prerogative cannot be used to change domestic 
law does not bite directly upon EU law if it is not, in the first place, domestic law.’103 The 
core argument here was that the design of the ECA meant that it never guaranteed any 
particular set of EU-law rights at all, but only such rights as were, ‘from time to time’, 
available under EU law, as it applied to the UK.  Hence EU law was said not to be domestic 
law or to give rise to domestic law rights because the statute giving effect to it, the ECA, was 
‘ambulatory’: it did not itself enact the rights but acted as a mere ‘conduit’ for the 
conveyance into domestic law of what remained a distinct body of treaty-based law. As 
such, the application of this body of law in the UK remained conditional upon the UK’s 
continued membership of the EU – and hence contingent on the continuing decision of the 
Executive not to use its prerogative powers to terminate that membership. Since the EU-law 
rights were only ever intended to have effect during the UK’s membership, withdrawal 
would neither frustrate the intention of Parliament nor remove ‘domestic rights’. Whether 
this argument was correct as a matter of statutory interpretation is an issue considered at 
                                                          
102 The extraordinarily influential blogpost setting out what became the core of the claimant’s case, 
by Nick Barber, Jeff King and Tom Hickman (the latter subsequently instructed as junior counsel for 
Gina Miller) did not rely on the De Keyser’s principle: ‘Pulling the Article 50 “Trigger”: Parliament’s 
Indispensable Role’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (27th June 2016). 
103 Elliott, note 44 at 271.  
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length elsewhere.104 The point for present purposes is not whether the argument is right or 
wrong; it is undoubtedly a cogent one that attracted considerable distinguished academic 
support as well as three of the eleven Supreme Court Justices.105 Rather the question is how 
the argument looks viewed through the lens of political constitutionalism.  
 In one important sense, the argument is neutral as between legal and political 
constitutionalism. It is a technical doctrinal argument, revolving around contested 
interpretations of Parliament’s intention and, in particular, rather conceptual propositions 
about the nature of EU law as it takes effect in domestic law. This was not a case like 
Evans,106 in which one side was seeking to apply legislation as drafted, and another was 
seeking drastically to ‘read it down’ by reference to common law constitutional principles.  
The claimants, rather, were arguing simply that since it was Parliament that had given effect 
to EU law in domestic law by statute, it must be Parliament that authorised the removal of 
that effect.  
If anything, the Government argument could be seen as inviting the judges to 
assume a power to decide that there is, in effect, a second-class category of statutes and of 
statutory rights: those that, unlike, normal statutory rights, count as subordinate to the 
prerogative. This is not the case in a formal sense, but it is in the practical and vital sense 
that the effect of this argument is to render the rights to which those statutes give effect 
removable by the Executive, using the prerogative - unlike other statutory rights.107 Such 
statutes are in one sense subordinate to the prerogative: they can be rendered ‘otiose’, or 
‘spent’ through Executive action; hence the rights given effect by such statutes exist only 
precariously, subject to Executive grace. As Emerton and Crawford put it, under this 
conception EU-law entitlements are not rights ‘firmly rooted in the law of the land’ but 
                                                          
104 For critical analysis see Phillipson, note 26 above; Paul Craig, ‘Miller, Structural Constitutional 
Review and the Limits of Prerogative Power’ [2017] Public Law (Brexit Special Issue 2017) 48 and, in 
the same volume, Robert Craig, ‘A simple application of the frustration principle: prerogative, 
statute and Miller’ [2017] Public Law (Brexit Special Issue 2017) 25; Tom Poole, ‘Devotion to 
Legalism: On the Brexit Case’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 696.  
105 Lord Reed, Lord Hughes and Lord Carnwarth.   
106 R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21.  
107 Finnis’s attempt to suggest that there was a clear existing analogy with Double Taxation Treaties 
was subject to comprehensive critique showing the contrary: see esp. K Beal, ‘The Taxing Issues 
Arising in Miller’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (14 Nov 2016); J King and N Barber, ‘In Defence of Miller’, U.K. 
Const. L. Blog (22 Nov 2016). I have argued that his attempted analogy with extradition legislation is 
also unpersuasive: note 26 above, at 12-13.   
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rather ‘transitory privileges that come and go, depending upon how the executive decides 
to conduct its international relations’.108 Given the hostility that some political 
constitutionalists have expressed towards the prerogative powers as lacking a democratic 
pedigree, compared to statute, one might have expected that in thus elevating Executive 
prerogative power over the continuing effect of these statutes, this argument might have 
made some political constitutionalists at least a little uneasy.109  
Of course its proponents would reply that they are not elevating prerogative over 
statute at all: their argument is precisely that Parliament intended to give effect to EU-law 
rights in a way that left them contingent upon a continued Executive decision to adhere to 
the EU treaties. But that argument in turn meets two difficulties. First, while there is a 
textual foundation for it in the particular ‘ambulatory’ design of the ECA, there is no direct 
textual evidence for it in the very different European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002  – 
which sets out in the body of the statute specific rights to stand and vote for elections to the 
European Parliament. Hence in making the argument that this statute should also be read as 
granting only rights ‘conditional’ on the prerogative, proponents ‘read in’ that contingency. 
Here therefore, the claimants were relying on a more literal, textual reading of an Act of 
Parliament; their opponents on a parliamentary intention, constructed without any direct 
textual support from the statutory language.110  
The second difficulty with the argument is that it requires a court to reconcile this de 
facto inferior status of the ECA with the fact that Parliament had famously given that statute 
an elevated status above that of ordinary Acts of Parliament: elevated in that it could—and 
did—override and displace even the provisions of future Acts of Parliament as the well-
known Factortame litigation demonstrated. The result of Factortame (No 2)111—the 
disapplication of the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988 by the earlier ECA—was so 
remarkable that it led Sir William Wade to describe the outcome of the case as a technical 
                                                          
108 Above, note 77, at 340.  
109 It did make one commentator uneasy: Keith Ewing refers to the Government’s key argument on 
conditionality as a ‘rather unattractive back door argument’ ‘rightly rejected by the majority’:  
above, note 8.  
110 Hence I refer to this as the ‘non-textual argument’ and discuss it, note 26  above, at 18-21.   
111 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603, applying 
s.2(4) ECA 
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‘revolution’.112 While this was doubtless an exaggeration, the rulings of the then House of 
Lords in Factortame (No 1)113 and Factortame (No 2) showed beyond doubt that the ECA, 
and the EU law it gives effect to, have an elevated constitutional status in UK law—and one 
that was bestowed by Parliament itself. Thus not only were the Government and its 
academic supporters arguing for (in effect) a second-class category of statutes but were 
doing so in the face of Parliament’s clear intention to endow the most important of these 
statutes with an elevated status that was unprecedented.114  
This feeds into the overall conclusion on the ‘conditionality’ argument. It may be 
described as ‘neutral’ as between legal and political constitutionalism because both it, and 
the rival claimant case, are genuine attempts to interpret and apply the intention of 
Parliament as expressed in the relevant legislation. But put together three factors: its 
elevation of prerogative power over the continuing effect of particular statutes; its ‘read-in’ 
of conditionality into the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002; and the incongruity of 
asserting that an exercise of the prerogative may lawfully negate the effect of a statute that 
Parliament had regarded as so important that it had protected it – unprecedentedly  - from 
implied repeal. Seen in this light, the argument begins to look concerned more with 
preserving Executive power than Parliament’s intent.  
 This takes us nicely to our final point – concerning ‘constitutional statutes’.  
VI. MILLER: PUTTING THE ‘CONSTITUTIONAL’ STATUS OF STATUTES BACK 
IN THE HANDS OF PARLIAMENT 
Both the Divisional Court and the Supreme Court were strongly influenced by the last point 
just made. Given that Parliament had afforded the ECA an elevated constitutional status 
above that of ordinary legislation such that it could override and displace even the 
provisions of future Acts of Parliament, they reasoned that it was most unlikely it had 
intended that the prerogative — a source of legal authority that ranks below Acts of 
Parliament—could be used to render the ECA a dead letter.115 Thus for both Miller courts, 
                                                          
112 Sir William Wade, ‘Sovereignty—Revolution or Evolution’ (1996) 112 LQR 568. 
113 [1990] 2 AC 85. 
114 As both Miller decisions noted: see below.  
115 The Divisional Court put it as follows: ‘Since in enacting the ECA as a statute of major 
constitutional importance, Parliament has indicated it should be exempt from casual, implied repeal 
by Parliament itself, still less can it be thought to be likely that Parliament nonetheless intended that 
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Parliament’s intention to bestow a heightened constitutional and legal status on the ECA 
was a crucially important factor. In response, critics have complained that it is wrong to 
claim that Parliament can give an Act ‘constitutional status’ that sets aside the doctrine of 
implied repeal. This is said to be erroneous because contrary to certain well-known obiter 
dicta of Laws J (as he then was) in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council,116 only the common 
law may bestow such status. In that case, the judge observed that Parliament: 
 
cannot stipulate as to the manner and form of any subsequent legislation. It cannot 
stipulate against implied repeal any more than it can stipulate against express 
repeal…The British Parliament has not the authority to authorise any such thing. 
Being sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty.117  
 
Commentary written by David Feldman118 and Mark Elliott and Hayley Hooper119 therefore 
argued that the Divisional Court had ‘mis-state[d] the process by which a statute comes to 
be regarded as ‘constitutional’; the Government’s case on appeal to the Supreme Court 
picked up and repeated that criticism.120  
 I have set out elsewhere my detailed argument that Thoburn was clearly wrong in 
asserting that only the courts, and not Parliament, can denote a given statute as having 
‘constitutional’ status, and so being immune from ordinary implied repeal.121 It is necessary 
for present purposes only to observe that this assertion is impossible to square with both 
the plain words of section 2(4) of the ECA122 and the effect given to them by a unanimous 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
its legal effects could be removed by the Crown through the use of its prerogative powers’ (above, 
note 49, at [88]). Similarly, the Supreme Court commented that ‘Ministers acting alone cannot cut 
off the source of EU law from the UK’ because:  ‘the source in question was brought into existence 
by Parliament through primary legislation [the ECA], which gave that source an overriding supremacy 
in the hierarchy of domestic law sources’ (Miller at [81], emphasis added).  
116 [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin); [2003] Q.B. 151. 
117 Ibid at [59].  
118 D Feldman, ‘Brexit, the Royal Prerogative, and Parliamentary Sovereignty’ UK Const. L. Blog (8 
Nov 2016). 
119 ‘Critical reflections on the High Court’s judgment in R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (7 Nov 2016). 
120 Above, note 29 (Appendix, para. 2).  
121 Phillipson, above note 26, 44-48.  
122 Section 2(4), by saying that any Act ‘to be passed’, that is, any future Act, must take effect ‘subject 
to’ the provisions of the 1972 Act that made EU law effective in UK law, suggest that the courts must 
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House of Lords in Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State (No 2),123 which held that the 
requirement to ‘disapply’ the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988 came directly from 
Parliament’s enacted intention, as expressed in s 2(4) of that Act. As Lord Bridge explained 
in Factortame (no 1), that provision: 
 
has precisely the same effect as if a section were incorporated in Part II of the 
Merchant Shipping Act of 1988 which in terms enacted that the provisions with 
respect to registration of British fishing vessels were to be without prejudice to the 
directly enforceable [EU law] rights of nationals of any Member State of the [EU].124 
 
For current purposes however, the key question is not which viewpoint is right as a 
matter of doctrine, but rather which elevates judicial power and which parliamentary 
power? The answer is obvious. The Thoburn approach privileges the role of courts: only the 
common law can elevate the status of a statute; Parliament is declared unable to do so. In 
contrast, the view of the court in Miller is that Parliament itself can decide to give one of its 
statutes a special constitutional status – and did so with the 1972 Act.125 Hence it is the 
courts in Miller that thus elevated parliamentary power in this area and its critics who would 
have continued to elevate judicial power. In this regard Miller plainly dealt a modest blow to 
common law constitutionalism by putting legislative intent firmly centre stage. Regardless of 
whether one regards that as doctrinally correct, it is clearly a modest step away from legal 
constitutionalism towards political constitutionalism.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
allow EU law to prevail over subsequent Acts of Parliament, thus suspending the normal doctrine of 
implied repeal.  
123 [1991] 1 AC 603.  
124 [1990] 2 AC 85. 
125 To be clear, I do not suggest this means that the courts are unable to bestow constitutional 
status, on a statute, merely that Parliament can too.  
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Ekins, in his critical commentary on Miller, quotes Lord Reed’s warning in that case with 
approval: ‘It is important for courts to understand that the legalisation of political issues is 
not always constitutionally appropriate, and may be fraught with risk, not least for the 
judiciary’.126 The concern of this article has not been to argue that Miller was correctly 
decided, but instead strongly to contest the notion that it amounted to the ‘legalisation of 
political issues’. It has argued that, given the case was concerned only with the extent and 
applicability of an admitted prerogative, and not the propriety of its exercise, the principle 
applied by the court was one that is both core to the rule of law and a means of enforcing 
parliament’s sovereignty: ultra vires.  It has sought to demonstrate that the broader-brush 
democratic arguments that, for good reason drew political constitutionalist to the 
government’s side, could not in the end affect this basic legal point. Finally, it has been 
argued that in at least one clear respect – its treatment of the ECA as a ‘constitutional 
statute’ – Miller amounts to a modest turn away from legal towards political 
constitutionalism. The conclusion is therefore clear: there was no good reason why political 
constitutionalists should have supported the Government side in Miller.     
                                                          
126 Miller at [240]; quoted by Ekins, above note 41 at 353.  
